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I. INTRODUCTION 
SOME THOUGHTS ON THE 
EVIDENTIARY ASPECTS 
OF TECHNOLOGICALLY 
PRESENTED OR 
PRODUCED EVIDENCE 
Fredric I. Lederer* 
Commentators have observed that if Thomas Jefferson or Patrick 
Henry were to be magically transported to the modern era neither 
would have difficulty practicing in a contemporary courtroom. This 
astute, often critical, and yet somewhat reassuring observation is be-
coming less true as modern technology permeates pretrial and trial 
practice. An ever increasing number of cases are dependent upon 
scanned documents and court-presented electronic visual images. 
Lawyers who increasingly have dragged technology into the court-
room on an ad hoc basis will soon find themselves practicing in inte-
grated high technology facilities. 1 Best illustrated by the 
internationally known Courtroom 21 Project at William & Mary Law 
School,2 the number of high technology courtrooms grows continually 
* Chancellor Professor of Law & Director, Courtroom 21, William & Mary Law School. 
Editors' Note: Professor Lederer has retained the copyright to this essay; any requests for re-
print should be directed to him at William & Mary Law School in Williamsburg, VA. Copyright 
© 1999 by Fredric I. Lederer. 
1. Consistent anecdotal evidence reports time savings on the order of one-quarter to one· 
third in cases tried with comprehensive electronic evidence display. This gives rise to a potential 
"cost-benefit" savings that impels a shift to technology augmented litigation. 
2. A joint project of William & Mary Law School and the National Center for State 
Courts, the Courtroom 21 Project, "The Courtroom of the 21st Century Today," includes the 
McGlothin Courtroom, the world's most technologically advanced trial and appellate court-
room. See generally Courtroom 21 Project (visited Feb. 14, 1999) <http://www.courtroom2l.net>. 
The courtroom is primarily a trial courtroom, but also functions as an appellate courtroom. See 
Fredric I. Lederer, Technology Comes to the Courtroom, and . .. , 43 EMORY L.J. 1095, 1098 
(1994). Courtroom 21 is used for in-house educational purposes, as a "model of integrated main-
stream, commercially available technology and as an experimental test-bed for various technolo-
gies." Jd. It is designed "to provide judges, court administrators, architects, lawyers, court 
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in both the state and federal courts. Faced with document cameras, 
computer-produced animations, witness-annotated electronic docu-
ments and illustrations, and remote live witnesses, all displayed on 
televisions and/or computer monitors, even Jefferson or Henry would 
have to defer a court appearance. . 
Our new technology-dependent trials necessarily raise a number 
of evidentiary questions. Perhaps chief among them are issues of best 
evidence, authentication, hearsay, and unfair prejudice. Counsel who 
seek to question a witness concerning a monitor image of a previously 
scanned or imaged document, for example, can expect multiple objec-
tions. How then should such objections be resolved? Are the current 
evidentiary rules and practices sufficient to deal with technology-aug-
mented trials? The answers to these questions may depend in large 
part upon one's approach to the law of evidence. 
At its heart, American evidentiary law is rule oriented. Whether 
common law or promulgated rule, our evidentiary law prizes certainty 
and stability. Although everyone recognizes the often extraordinary 
degree of discretion vested in trial judges to decide concrete eviden-
tiary issues, practitioners demand that evidentiary law and practice be 
based upon a substantial core of clear cut rules.3 Any review of the 
evidentiary implications of technology-augmented litigation can ad-
dress compliance with currently existing rules, or it can also probe into 
the usually unstated or assumed human and policy assumptions be-
hind those rules. Sharply different results may flow from the ap-
proach chosen. Although the practitioner may well seek solely to rely 
on the black letter rules of the jurisdiction, arguing that it is for the 
legislature or other rule makers to be concerned with deeper matters 
of policy, sufficient flexibility and discretion exist in the trial judge to 
permit, if not require, the judge to reach such questions. What follows 
is a brief, admittedly incomplete, pondering of some of these matters, 
primarily using the Federal Rules of Evidence for purposes of 
discussion. 
reporters, and others concerned with courtroom activities with a functional model courtroom" 
within which they can test and devise "technological solutions to their unique needs." Id. This 
Essay is informed by the experimental work conducted by the Project. 
3. Accordingly, the call by academic commentators for a largely discretionary hearsay rule 
failed when the Federal Rules of Evidence took final form. Instead, the well-known structure of 
the general rule with numerous exceptions was adopted. See FEo. R. Evm. 801-03. 
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II. IN GENERAL: THE BEST EviDENCE QuESTION 
A. Electronically Presented Evidence 
Initially, it is useful to distinguish between evidence that is only 
presented or shown electronically and evidence that is itself electronic 
in nature or that has been converted into electronic format. Likely 
the simplest example of electronically presented evidence is a photo-
graph that is displayed at trial via a document camera. The document 
camera is a simple, vertically mounted television camera that captures 
the image of anything placed below it and displays the image on an 
attached television set or computer monitor.4 
Having laid whatever foundation may be necessary to establish 
logical relevance, counsel would place the photograph on the horizon-
tal stand of the document camera. The image would then be available 
to judge, witness, and opposing counsel.5 Counsel would then ask the 
witness to identify the photograph. Authentication would proceed 
and, assuming compliance with other applicable rules, the photograph 
would be offered and admitted. In this example, the underlying evi-
dence is non-electronic in nature. If the actual photograph is tendered 
to the fact finder, the electronic image can be treated as the equivalent 
of a photocopy, used solely for convenience. This presents no eviden-
tiary issues if the underlying admissibility of the photograph has al-
ready been established. But if the image is used to establish 
admissibility, what is actually being offered is not the original photo-
graph but the electronic duplicate image in which case the witness, 
counsel, judge, and in a jury trial, the jury, may never see the original 
photograph. Instead, all will view and act upon an electronic image. 
Is a best evidence challenge available? In these circumstances, the 
image functions as electronically produced evidence. 
B. Electronically Produced Evidence 
Electronically produced evidence can be defined as evidence that 
originates as digital material or that is, regardless of origin, produced 
in court solely as digital material. Perhaps the best examples are digi-
tal photographs and digital audio and video recordings. 
4. Although a number of companies manufacture similar products, this type of device is 
often referred to as an "ELMO," "DOAR Communicator," or " (Wolfvision) Visualizer," taking 
the name from three of the best-known companies in the field. 
5. In civil cases it is likely that the evidentiary admissibility would have previously been 
established via pre-trial order. 
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The Best Evidence Rule ordinarily requires that "[t]o prove the 
content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original ... is re-
quired .... "6 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 1001(4), an electronic 
image of our photograph, for example, would seem to be a duplicate 7 
produced in court solely as electronic digital or analog material,8 and 
as such, under Federal Rule of Evidence 1003, ordinarily "admissible 
to the same extent as the original";9 in some cases the image may 
even be defined by Rule 1001 as an "original."10 
The definition of "duplicate" must be reconsidered, however, 
before accepting the admissibility of the image in lieu of the original 
physical image. Electronic visual images of original non-digital evi-
dence nearly always differ in some particulars from the "hard copy" 
originals.U Current technology is such that even if a totally accurate 
image of the original is made or captured, the displayed image will 
differ in color and resolution. Except in the most extraordinary instal-
lation, it is almost certain that the same photograph, displayed on two 
or more video monitors, will have at least subtle color balance, shad-
ing, and/or brightness differences, as each monitor reproduces the im-
age slightly differently. Small markings on the original, including 
physical creasing and the like, may be difficult or impossible to detect 
in an electronic image. Can the resulting multiple, yet only slightly 
differing, reproductions be termed "duplicates?" In the widely-re-
ported Unabomber case, for example, the defense moved to prohibit 
6. FED. R. Evm. 1002. 
7. See FED. R. Evm. 1001(4) (stating that a duplicate is "a counterpart produced by the 
same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by means of photography, including 
. .. mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction"). 
8. Technically speaking, some "electronic" material is analog and not digital in nature. To 
avoid unnecessary technicality, this Essay ordinarily does not distinguish between analog and 
digital material. 
9. FED. R. Evm. 1003. The rule provides for the admissibility of duplicates unless "a genu-
ine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original," or "it would be unfair to admit the 
duplicate in lieu of the original." ld. 
10. If the image is produced from data "stored in a computer or similar device, any printout 
or other output readable by sight, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an original." FED. R. 
Evm. 1001(3). In the computer scenario, all data printouts are identical. In the case of the 
document camera, the process is closer to a photographic enlargement or reproduction and thus 
more likely a "duplicate." 
11. New forms of digital evidence include the IPIX "photobubble" or immersive reality. 
The computer displays a 360 degree photograph, which can be rotated about the center point. 
Assuming the process that produces this impressive image does not create distortions of signifi-
cance, this type of evidence has no "hard copy" or traditional equivalent. 
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the government's use of electronic document images on the grounds 
that they were not true duplicates of the original paper documents.12 
Rule 1001(3) and (4) require "accurate" reproductionP Rule 
1003(2) permits admission of a "duplicate" unless "it would be unfair 
to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original."14 A black letter rule 
analysis unavoidably yields the conclusion that in one sense the image 
and the original are not identical. Yet even the quickest examination 
of the intent of the Federal Rules yields a ruling in ~upport of the 
images. In the Unabomber prosecution, it is my understanding from 
speaking with members of the prosecution team that had the case not 
been resolved by plea, the government would have offered the images 
solely for the textual content ·of the defendant's writings.15 The color 
and condition of the originals would have been irrelevant. Under 
these circumstances, the electronic image would have been a true du-
plicate, just as a black and white photocopy would have been, which is 
already usually considered a duplicate under Rule 1001(4).16 Insofar 
as the reason for which the evidence is offered, the image is an accu-
rate copy of the original. Accordingly, ur;tless the differences in elec-
tronic display and reproduction are logically relevant, any differences 
from the original are of no evidentiary consequence. 
C. Scanned Documents 
Document-camera presented evidence is customary in at least 
hundreds of American courtrooms. What is less frequent but of in-
creasing importance, especially in major cases, is scanned or imaged 
documentary evidence. To scan a document, photograph, or the like, 
one places the original on or in a scanner. The scanner in effect takes 
an electronic picture of the original using a process similar to that 
used for photocopying. The resolution and color validity of the elec-
tronic image primarily depend upon the quality of the scanner and the 
way in which the electronic image is recorded. Scans can be imper-
12. See Opposition to Government's Motion to Use Computer Litigation, United States v. 
Kaczynski, No. CR-S-96-259GEB, 1997 WL 567038, at *2-*3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 1997). The trial 
judge denied the motion by order. 
13. FED. R. Evro. 1001(3), (4). 
14. FED. R. Evro. 1003(2). 
15. While counsel were still preparing for a contested trial, the author informally and briefly 
consulted with the prosecution concerning technology-related evidentiary issues. 
16. See FED. R. Evro. 1001(4). 
394 SOUTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28 
feet, primarily for physical reasons such as improper feeding of the 
original into the scannerP 
Computer scanning should be distinguished from optical charac-
ter recognition (OCR). When one OCR's a document, one instructs a 
computer to use special software to review a scanned document and 
convert the image of the document into computer-recognizable text 
for purposes such as computerized searching of the document. Opti-
cal character recognition is almost never perfect, and inaccurate word 
conversions are customary, requiring human proofing if perfect accu-
racy is required. In courtroom evidentiary presentation, however, it is 
only the electronic images that are presented in evidence. OCR ver-
sions of the documents may be used by counsel to help determine 
which images to offer, but it is only the images that are offered. Ac-
cordingly, offering scanned images preserved on, for example, a CD-
ROM disk, is functionally identical with use of the document cam-
era-unless there is reason to suspect an inaccurate copying of the 
original. The proponent must authenticate the image and qualify it as 
a duplicate. Whether authentication should mean something more 
than our traditional methods18 is another matter. 
Ill. THE AUTHENTICATION/DIGITAL ALTERATION QUESTION 
Nearly every Courtroom 21 presentation seems to result in at 
least one question concerning the courtroom validity of digital infor-
mation, given the ease with which such information can be searnlessly 
altered. There are methods that can at least diminish the chances of 
such alteration, but that fail to address the central issue. Suppose a 
witness is shown a photograph. Traditional authentication require-
ments will be served when the witness identifies the image as accu-
rate-testimony of a witness with knowledge will suffice.19 Suppose, 
however, that the image is a digital one, displayed perhaps by com-
puter from a CD-ROM disk; should the same result apply? To the 
degree that we consult Federal Rule of Evidence 901, or its common 
law equivalent, the answer is clearly yes.20 But it has been suggested 
17. We had at least one first hand incident in an experimental Courtroom 21 Laboratory 
Trial of an image which, for some electronic reason, lacked one internal paragraph. The omis-
sion occurred in such a way as to effectively change an autopsy report. 
18. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 901(b) (setting forth, by way of illustration, examples of authen-
tication conforming with the Rule's requirements). 
19. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 90l(b)(1). 
20. See supra notes 4-16 and accompanying text (discussing best evidence issues). 
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that the combination of technology and human perceptual limits could 
dictate a different result.21 
The argument goes thusly: when a person looks at an image, the 
person does not, and perhaps cannot, verify all components of the im-
age. Instead, the person confirms some of the components. That 
serves to authenticate the entire image, as it is unlikely that part of a 
photograph could be accurate and part inaccurate, and photographic 
tampering could be detected. The digital critic then points out that 
any aspect of the digital image can be altered electronically, poten-
tially without tell-tale signs of alteration. This perspective questions 
witness authentication of many digital images; although the witness 
has identified one part of the image as accurate, that tells us nothing 
about the remainder. 
Yet what of a traditional photograph? Are the two image tech-
nologies really so very different? Photographs can be altered. Con-
cededly, such alterations may be easier to detect. If the digital critic's 
assertion that the witness only verifies part of an image is correct, that 
is a distinction without a meaningful difference as the witness could be 
fooled by either technology. The critical distinction comes into play 
only if there is a reason to question the image and refer it for expert 
analysis, and the expert can detect photographic alterations but not 
digital ones. 
Given the nature of the adversary system, our evidentiary rules 
actually are rather undemanding. Admissibility rules such as authen-
tication are easily satisfied, leaving it to the parties to deal with evi-
dentiary sufficiency. American courts have dealt with real and alleged 
forged evidence since the beginning of the nation. In the absence of 
modern scientific techniques, parchment documents skillfully forged 
with quill pens presented formidable questions of detection and 
proof.22 Isn't the current ability to digitally alter or fabricate evidence 
the same problem-or is it? 
21. I am indebted to the faculty of the June, 1998, National Advocacy Center Department 
of Justice's Technology for Investigations and Prosecutions course for this argument. 
22. Even in the 20th Century, forgery detection can be difficult. Absent a professionally 
questioned document examiner, "it is often impossible for a layman ... to detect a well-executed 
forgery .... " ANDREA A. MoENSSENs ET AL., SciENTIFic EviDENCE IN CRIMINAL CAsEs 412 
(1973). "The scientific examination of questioned documents, however, did not develop into a 
distinct profession until about 1870." /d. at 140. Note that "[i]n a leading experiment assessing 
the accuracy of lay handwriting identification, Professor Inbau found that lay opinions suffer 
from 'an appalling degree of inaccuracy.' In this study, the highest accuracy attained by a lay 
witness was 29% and the average was only 11 %." 2 PAuL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IM-
WINKELRIED, SciENTIFIC EviDENCE 140-41 (2d ed. 1993) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Fred R. 
Inbau, Lay Witness Identification of Handwriting, 34 ILL. L. REv. 433 (1939)). 
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IV. CoMPUTER ANIMATIONs: HEARSAY, SciENTIFIC EviDENCE, 
AND UNFAIR PREJUDICE 
When lawyers and laypeople think of computer-produced evi-
dence, they often think of computer-produced animations. Computer 
animations are used for a variety of purposes, including basic educa-
tion of judge or jury, illustration of a testifying expert's testimony, 
presentation of computer-originated or computer-derived data, and 
enhancement of opening statements and closing arguments. In the 
simplest case, an animation is only an electronic illustration, no differ-
ent than an artist's electronic pen and ink drawing. In the most so-
phisticated use, the computer uses programming to process inputted 
data in order to display a visual result. In the courtroom, the anima-
tion can be generated on-site by a computer or, as has been more 
customary in the past, displayed by pre-recorded videotape. 
Ordinarily, the evidentiary issues inherent in any given animation 
use are simple, as are the answers.Z3 An animation used by an expert 
to visually illustrate the expert's testimony is not "evidence," in the 
rigorous sense.24 It is merely "demonstrative evidence," which is itself 
an inadequately defined, quasi-evidentiary category not customarily 
dealt with under traditional evidence rules.25 The published opinions 
are characterized by inconsistent terminology, making it difficult to 
determine what the rule is in any given case.Z6 Rather than concen-
trating on the specific purpose for which the animation was to be used, 
or was used, many judges have sought to classify the animation in 
more general terms.27 A "reconstruction" animation, for example, 
could mean anything, depending upon the author-judge. And given 
23. As opposed to the always-hard-to-determine question of what constitutes unfair 
prejudice. 
24. The "evidence" is the testimony of the expert. Counsel proffers the animation simply 
as a fair and accurate visual illustration of the testimony. See, e.g., People v. McHugh, 476 
N.Y.S.2d 721 (1984). Of course, the animation may have significant persuasive impact, highlight-
ing the difficulty implicit in claiming that the illustration is not "evidence." 
25. "Demonstrative evidence" is not dealt with per se by the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
Most jursidictions are primarily concerned with potential unfair prejudice. See, e.g. , Robinson v. 
Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 16 F.3d 1083 (lOth Cir. 1994). 
26. The terms "reconstruction," "re-enactment," "simulation," or "visualization" are com-
monly used. See, e.g., Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, 81 F.3d 416, 425 (4th Cir. 1996); Robinson, 
16 F.3d at 1089 n.7; Vomado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., No. 92-1543-WEB, 
1995 WL 794070, at *3 (D. Kan. Nov. 29, 1995). 
· 27. Hence, admissibility is oft~n related to the terminology chosen. Courts that term ani-
mations "reconstructions," for example, are far more likely to hold them to a high standard, thus 
making them more likely to be inadmissible, than courts that describe them as "illustrations" or 
"demonstrations." Cf Gilbert v. Cosco, Inc., 989 F.2d 399, 402 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Experiments 
which purport to recreate an accident must be conducted under conditions similar to that acci-
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the difficulty in replicating the conditions surrounding a given inci-
dent, the courts have often been hostile to "reconstructions" on at 
least logical relevance grounds.28 
A. Hearsay 
When an image is used as substantive evidence,29 hearsay consid-
erations can come into play. Unless based upon admitted evidence, 
an animation that embodies its supporting data and merely displays a 
result, might be challenged as based upon hearsay .3° Federal Rule of 
Evidence 703, however, permits experts to rely on information "of a 
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in form-
ing opinions or inferences upon the subject . . . . "31 If an expert is 
involved and an appropriate foundation is laid, Rule 703 is likely to 
suffice to justify the use of the animation.32 
The greater problem is likely to be the detailed content of the 
animation. Rule 703 is not generally interpreted as permitting the ex-
pert to be a hearsay conduit.33 The opinion is admissible, the underly-
ing data is not-at least until the opponent opens the door via cross-
dent, while experiments that demonstrate general principles used in forming an expert's opinion 
are not required to adhere strictly to the conditions of the accident."). 
28. See generally Datshow v. Teledyne Continental Motors Aircraft Prods., 826 F. Supp. 677 
(W.D.N.Y. 1993). In Datskow, the district court judge stated that: 
Defendant's major objection to the video is that it was less an illustration of Sommer's 
testimony than a purported re-creation of the accident, and as such was unduly prejudi-
cial. Defendant made the same argument at trial, and I overruled the objection at that 
time, stating (outside the presence of the jury) that I would allow the tape to be shown 
"to help the jury understand the expert's opinion as to what happened and that it's not 
meant to be a re-creation. It's some visualization to allow the jury to conceptualize and 
appreciate the expert's opinion as to what happened here." 
/d. at 685 (quoting the Record at 724). 
29. There can be a stark variance between an image's intended and actual use. When the 
details inherent in an animation's depiction go beyond the actual testimony of the expert, the 
additional details are likely to be perceived by the fact finder as being offered for their substan-
tive content. 
30. See FED. R. Evm. 801(c) (defining hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted"). 
31. FED. R. Evm. 703. 
32. In the alternative, in some cases the proponent might successfully assert, by at least 
analogy, under Rule 1006, that the animation constitutes a "summary" of its underlying data. 
See FED. R. Evm. 1006 ("contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs which 
cannot conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a chart, summary, or 
calculation"). Given the Rule's express reference to "contents of voluminous writings, record-
ings, or photographs," it may be too large a stretch to argue that under the Rule, an animation is 
appropriate as a summary of data. ld. Further, data is not susceptible to examination or copy-
ing, as Rule 1006 requires, in the same sense as documents. See id. 
33. See FED. R. Evm. 703 advisory committee's note. 
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examination.34 An animation often includes, sometimes necessarily, 
the details of how the proponent maintains that the given event oc-
curred. Those details may well mean the visual presentation of hear-
say information to the fact finder. Accordingly, even if an animation 
is allegedly used only to illustrate testimony, a significant hearsay 
problem could exist if the displayed details are not yet in evidence or 
offered subject to later connection. 
B. "Scientific Evidence" Concerns 
Clearly, the most extreme evidentiary situation is one in which 
the proponent intentionally, or accidentally, is using computer output 
itself as substantive scientific evidence. This would implicate Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.35 and all of the usual founda-
tional questions, including the accuracy of the underlying data and the 
validity of both the scientific concepts inherent in the computer's pro-
grammmg, as well as the accuracy of the implementation of those 
concepts. 36 
C. Unfair Prejudice 
Both common law and the Federal Rules of Evidence permit 
otherwise admissible evidence to be excluded when the evidence gives 
rise to an unreasonable risk of unfair prejudice.37 Electronically 
presented and produced evidence may present such a risk. High pro-
duction quality animations in particular may convey to some jurors 
greater probative value than may be justified by the actual content. 
At the same time, the closer an animation is to reality (i.e., a video-
taped re-enactment), the higher the risk that the fact finder might sub-
liminally interpret the animation as objective fact. Certainly a judicial 
instruction might cure any risk in all but the most realistic anima-
tions,38 and this risk would likely be less if a fact finder were faced at 
trial with conflicting or dueling animations. Ironically, if production 
34. See FED. R. Evm. 705 (permitting an expert to testify "in terms of opinions ... without 
first testifying to the underlying facts or data ... . The expert may ... be required to disclose the 
underlying facts or data on cross-examination."). 
35. 509 u.s. 579 (1993). 
36. See id. at 592-95; cf Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (applicable 
in non-Daubert states). 
37. See FED. R. Evm. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . .. "). 
38. What I sometimes call the "Jurassic Park effect" could come into play. Although one's 
intellect may recognize what the animation is, even to the degree of marveling at its excellence, 
that recognition may be unimportant if one's entire psyche is reacting at a more basic level by 
mentally screaming, "dinosaur, run!" 
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quality raises an unfair prejudice risk, proponents might be better 
served in some cases by foregoing any efforts at Hollywood glitz. 
v. THE DISPLAy FACTOR 
Electronically presented evidence, which ordinarily includes elec-
tronically produced evidence, must be displayed to be perceived. Ab-
sent occasional gruesome photographs and the like, the appearance of 
evidence in traditional cases rarely gives rise to unfair prejudice con-
cerns. This need not be the case when evidence is displayed 
electronically. 
Display methods range from individual computer monitors,39 to 
televisions, to very large television/monitors, to front or rear projec-
tion systems of eight-foot diagonal size or greater. Large display 
screens are often favored because a single large screen system can be 
cheaper than numerous smaller high quality displays. Although we 
have no data, it seems almost certain that the means of display must 
factor into at least the unfair prejudice determination. Evidence 
blown up on a ten-foot diagonal screen may well be perceived as 
overly persuasive-certainly that is a complaint the Courtroom 21 
Project used to receive when remote witnesses testifying by videocon-
ferencing were displayed on our large screen. At the same time, we 
have heard lawyers complain that document display on small monitors 
appeared purged of persuasive ability and psychologically distanced 
from the viewer. Are these evidentiary concerns? Certainly they are 
not new concerns; judges have had to deal with them for generations, 
every time counsel sought to bring in large, sometimes very large pho-
tographs, charts, and models. To dismiss these issues as merely a mat-
ter of demonstrative evidence seems misplaced, however. A Rule 403 
determination should take into account the manner of evidentiary dis-
play, as well as the content, if we are truly to control unfair prejudice. 
Electronically presented and produced evidence also permits 
electronically emphasized evidence. Image cutouts, color-highlight-
ing, blow-ups, and the like can all be done electronically, either by 
prior creation or during trial, using specialized hardware or software. 
Does the use of a spur-of-the-moment color-highlighted enlargement 
of a key sentence from a document create a danger of unfair preju-
dice? Certainly, the evidence itself is not implicated. If there is a 
problem, it is with the method of presentation, the functional 
39. The judge will usually have a 15- to 21-inch monitor; jurors frequently will have one 
monitor for every two jurors. 
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equivalent of counsel putting up a large board with the sentence cut 
out. The judge has the power to control the method of presentation,40 
so there can be no doubt about the judge's power to limit or prohibit a 
method of presentation. The real question is whether there is any-
thing to fear. Effective presentation surely is not the same as unfair 
prejudice. There is little reason to believe, absent studies yet to be 
conducted, that this would be improper. 
VI. REMOTE TESTIMONY 
In many respects the evidentiary issues raised by technology are 
best illustrated by the new capability to receive live testimony via 
videoconferencing.41 In the Courtroom 21 Project's McGlothlin 
Courtroom, a forty-inch diagonal SONY® television monitor has 
been installed immediately behind the witness stand. When remote 
testimony is taken, the participants in the courtroom see the life-size 
image of the remote witness.42 The remote witness sees a multi-frame 
television image of four specific portions of the courtroom,43 the 
speaker, and a comprehensive image of the entire courtroom. The 
witness can effectively see everything. And, of course, there is two-
way audio.44 Direct and cross-examination proceed as customary. 
Evidence can be displayed electronically via document cameras, com-
puters, or facsimile. 
Remote testimony's use is increasingly frequent, and is now ex-
pressly authorized in federal civil cases. 
In every trial, the testimony of witnesses shall be taken in open 
court, unless a federal law, these rules, the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court provide other-
wise. The court may, for good cause shown in compelling 
circumstances and upon appropriate safeguards, permit presenta-
tion of testimony in open court by contemporaneous transmission 
from a different location.45 
Although the question of where the oath can be effectively given is a 
significant one, as is the related question of where, if at all, perjury can 
40. See FED. R. EvrD. 6ll(a) (providing for the mode and order of interrogation and 
presentation). 
41. As distinguished from recorded videotaped testimony. 
42. This would enable witnesses to testify from anywhere-preferably, in a remote 
courthouse. 
43. The viewable image contains the bench, the counsel tables, and the witness stand. 
44. The McGlothlin Courtroom even includes, via AT&T LanguageLine®, the ability to 
translate testimony into 140 different languages. 
45. FED. R. Crv. P. 43(a). 
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be prosecuted,46 technical rule-type evidentiary issues are not signifi-
cantly presented. Yet the whole concept of remote testimony un-
avoidably raises fundamental evidentiary issues. 
Remote testimony forces us, for example, to examine our as-
sumptions about the utility and desirability of in-court direct and 
cross-examination. What does "confrontation" mean, in both the 
legal47 and practical sense? Remote testimony raises the question of 
what we truly mean by demeanor evidence and the degree to which 
our fact finders should rely on it. After all, absent new high-definition 
television, the courtroom image may not contain as much visual infor-
mation as in-court testimony-although a large screen display might 
make the witness even more visible than when physically present. Nu-
merous judges and lawyers visiting the Courtroom 21 Project have 
been troubled by remote testimony, complaining that their self-pro-
claimed ability to tell truth from falsity depends upon the witness's 
actual presence in the courtroom. Yet remote testimony easily per-
mits the live question-and-answer process of examination usually 
thought of as direct and cross-examination. 
Assuming modern high quality technology, live two-way testi-
mony presents at least these questions: 
(1) To what extent do remote witnesses differ from in-court wit-
nesses in truth-telling, and does the location of the remote physical 
testimony matter? 
(2) How, if at all, does demeanor evidence consist of more than 
hearing and seeing the witness testify? 
46. Witness testimony requires that a witness first swear or affirm to tell the truth. See, e.g., 
FED. R. EviD. 603. Modernly, the oath or affirmation is of particular importance because viola-
tion permits a perjury prosecution and conviction, yielding some degree of faith in the testimony. 
See, e.g., Harrell v. State, 709 So. 2d 1364, 1368 (Fla. 1998) ("Thus, the Confrontation Clause also 
ensures . . . that the witness will give the testimony under oath, impressing upon the witness the 
seriousness of the matter and protecting against a lie by the possibility of penalty of perjury."). 
Thus, a court may condition remote testimony upon a finding that the remote witness, testifying 
from another state or nation, is potentially subject to a possible perjury prosecution. See id. at 
1371. 
/d. 
To ensure that the possibility of perjury is not an empty threat for those witnesses (who] 
testify via satellite from outside the United States, it must be established that there 
exists an extradition treaty between the witness's country and the United States, and 
that such a treaty permits extradition for the crime of perjury. In the present case, an 
extradition treaty does exist between the United States and Argentina. 
47. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 852 (1990) (holding that given a case-specific find-
ing of necessity, one-way video testimony by a child victim did not violate the Sixth Amend-
ment); Harrell v. State, 709 So. 2d 1364, 1371 (Fla. 1998) (holding that two-way satellite 
testimony of crime victims in a foreign country did not violate federal or state constitutional 
requirements); United States v. Gigante, 971 F. Supp. 755, 759 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (authorizing a 
witness in a RICO case to testify by closed-circuit television). 
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(3) To what extent do judges and jurors perceive remote witnesses 
as testifying truthfully as compared to those giving in-court 
testimony? 
(4) Does remote testimony create a more substantial risk of evi-
dence fabrication or alteration than does in-court testimony; if so, 
can technology supply sufficient safeguards? 
(5) To what extent do even partial "virtual trials" call into question 
societal acceptance of adjudication as a generally fair and accepta-
ble resolution of disputes? 
(6) Is a declarant who is available by videoconferencing "unavaila-
ble" within the meaning of the hearsay exceptions that require 
una vail a bili ty?48 
(7) Should video testimony be preferred to hearsay for some of the 
situations in which hearsay is now acceptable even when declarants 
are available?49 
Four experiments conducted by or in conjunction with the Court-
room 21 Project indicate that jurors find remote testimony to be 
neither better nor worse than in-court testimony. The answers to 
most of the other questions remain to be determined. Notwithstand-
ing this, as already noted, direct and cross-examination under oath can 
be accomplished.50 Yet is this "testimony?" Do we apply the literal 
text of the evidentiary rules, or should we ponder the larger interests 
inherent in those rules? 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Most technology-related evidentiary questions can be resolved 
under existing evidentiary rules. Indeed, in most cases the issues they 
raise are strikingly similar to those produced by low-technology 
48. The new Rule 804(a) defines "unavailability as a witness" for purposes of the relevant 
hearsay exceptions as situations in which the declarant: 
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying con-
cerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or 
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the declarant's state-
ment despite an order of the court to do so; or 
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or 
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing 
physical or mental illness or infirmity; or 
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of a statement has been unable to 
procure the declarant's attendance (or in the case of a hearsay exception under subdivi-
sion (b)(2), (3), or (4), the declarant's attendance or testimony) by process or other 
reasonable means. 
FED. R. Ev!D. 804{a)(l)-(5). 
49. If the exceptions under Federal Rule of Evidence 803, for example, are based in part on 
the desire to avoid the expense of bringing witnesses to court, would not cheap, remote testi-
mony both meet that need and enhance the fact-finding process? See FED. R. Evm. 102. 
50. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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equivalents. Notwithstanding this, some technology presented or pro-
duced evidence raises significant questions of policy, questions that 
are likely to be addressed on a case-by-case basis as judges ponder the 
application of traditional rules to new procedures and forms of evi-
dence. Although this traditional method of fleshing out legal ques-
tions has merit, it would be more efficient in some areas if critical 
matters could be resolved early by statute or rule. Victoria, Australia, 
for example, has addressed the entire issue of remote testimony by 
comprehensive statute to include technology requirementsY Some 
areas, such as the ability to prosecute a remote extrajurisdiction wit-
ness for perjury, may need federal statute or individual state 
enactments. 
Although bar, bench, and legislative representatives ought to be 
considering these matters, there can be no gainsaying that the pace of 
change is acute. While the speed of change likely augurs for some 
form of statutory or rule clarification (if only in the interests of pre-
dictability and efficiency), it also suggests caution, lest we act too 
soon, and before we have sufficient experience. The one requirement 
most likely to be of immediate use is advance notice by a proponent of 
the intent to use technology produced or presented evidence.52 No-
tice, along with pretrial disclosure (permitting the opposing party to 
carefully review documents and other evidence for possible unex-
pected discrepancies) would go a long way to moot concerns about 
digital alteration and would permit considered decisions about in-
court practices that could otherwise affect admissibility decisions. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 102 declares: "These rules shall be con-
strued to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable 
expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the 
law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and pro-
ceedings justly determined."53 Technologically presented and pro-
duced evidence holds great promise for satisfying the commendable 
purposes announced in Rule 102. Whether that will actually prove to 
be the case remains to be seen. Whether Jefferson or Henry could 
practice in the courtrooms of the new century is not really the ques-
tion. The real question is whether they would be proud of what they, 
and we, would see in those courtrooms. 
51. See Evidence (Audio Visual and Audio Linking) Act 1997, No. 4 (Austl.). 
52. This is a key part of an amendment to Maryland's civil procedure rules. The new Rule 
is Mo. R. C1v. P. 2-504.3 (1998) (Computer-Generated Evidence and Material). 
53. FEo. R. Evm. 102. 
